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JUSTICE SCALIA REINVENTS RESTITUTION 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
Equitable restitution is unrecognizable in recent Supreme Court 
decisions.  The Court, led by Justice Scalia, is reinventing equitable 
restitution in order to deny relief to claimants.  Its most recent 
pronouncement came in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. 
Knudson,1 where a divided Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia held 
that “equitable relief” authorized by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not include claims for 
specific performance or restitution seeking money for breach of 
contract.2  Instead, the Court held that with respect to restitution, the 
term “equitable relief” includes only those restitutionary remedies 
which were historically available in courts of equity.3  Using this 
definition, Justice Scalia narrowly classified as equitable restitution 
only those claims for an accounting for profits, equitable lien, or 
constructive trust that seek the return of specific funds held by the 
defendant.4  None of these types of remedies was expressly sought 
by Great-West.5  Instead, the insurance company simply enforced the 
subrogation clause of its contract with Knudson, the insured, to 
                                                                                                                                      
 * Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. 
 1. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
 2. See id. at 209–12.  A civil action under ERISA may be brought “by a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which 
violates . . . the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable 
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of . . . the 
terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 3. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 209–10. But see WILLIAM Q. DE 
FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 1–2 (Erwin N. Griswold et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1956) (stating that equity is commonly defined as the system of 
jurisprudence originally administered by the High Court of Chancery in 
England, but arguing that such a definition invites inquiry rather than answers); 
PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 7–21 (1990) (discussing the question of 
“What is Equity?”). 
 4. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 213. 
 5. See id. at 204. 
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recover for medical bills paid by the insurance company but 
subsequently recouped by Knudson from a third-party tortfeasor.6 
This Article levels two criticisms at the Court’s holding in 
Great-West Life.  The primary critique is that the Supreme Court 
distorted history and equity to reach its result on restitution.  
Historically, equitable restitution was not restricted to three types of 
formalistic claims seeking only the return of plaintiff’s specific 
funds.  To the contrary, equity was a flexible legal alternative that 
issued a variety of monetary remedies in order to address the failure 
of the hyper-formalist common law courts to redress wrongs.7  
Moreover, despite Justice Scalia’s claim that the Court can easily 
distinguish between law and equity,8 it is not a simple task to discern 
historical rules of equity.  For example, with respect to restitution, 
there is significant overlap between the rules of equitable and legal 
restitution due to the parallel development of restitution historically 
in both courts of common law and equity in order to fill the gaps 
created by other remedies.9  Moreover, the historical distinctions 
between equity and law have long been forgotten as it has been 
commonly assumed that the merger of law and equity obviated the 
need to distinguish the ancient remedial forms.10  However, Justice 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See id.  In Great-West Life, a medical insurance company brought an 
ERISA action seeking reimbursement of $411,157 in benefits paid to Janet 
Knudson from a $650,000 settlement she obtained from Hyundai as 
compensation for the injuries she incurred as a result of its defective product.  
See id. at 207–08.  Great-West’s plan expressly required the beneficiary to 
reimburse the company out of any settlement proceeds obtained from third 
parties for injuries covered by the plan.  See id. at 207–09. 
 7. See DE FUNIAK, supra note 3, at 5, 8 (noting that a growing worship of 
formalism and technicality began to obsess the courts of law leading to the 
gradual diminishment of the relief awarded to only pecuniary compensation in 
the nature of damages); see also George Burton Adams, The Origin of English 
Equity (1916), in SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY 1, 10–11 (Edward D. Re ed., 
1955) (discussing the need for equity because common law became an 
inflexible system). 
 8. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210–11. 
 9. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION 384–92 (2d ed. 1993); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES 529 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES]; Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of 
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989) [hereinafter Laycock, The 
Scope and Significance of Restitution]. 
 10. See Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 204–05 (1893) (“Though by it 
all differences in forms of action be abolished; though all remedies be 
THOMAS_POST_RR_FINAL 3/27/03  4:53 PM 
Winter 2003] SCALIA REINVENTS RESTITUTION 1065 
Scalia’s return to the past in defining equitable relief resurrects the 
outdated distinctions between law and equity and makes them even 
more significant today.  This Article does not attempt the Herculean 
task of detailing the history of equitable restitution.  Instead, it 
suggests that the dearth of scholarship on historical equity creates a 
dangerous opportunity for courts, like the Supreme Court in Great-
West Life, to issue decisions unguided by accurate knowledge, yet 
insulated from knowing challenge. 
Accordingly, this Article’s second criticism of Great-West Life 
is that the Court improperly interpreted modern remedial statutory 
language by historical reference.11  This Article suggests that 
statutory language distinguishing legal and equitable remedies 
should instead be interpreted by the purpose of the remedy sought.  
Remedies generally are classified according to their purpose to 
compensate, punish, disgorge an unjust benefit, or prevent future 
harm.12  A purpose test rather than a historical inquiry for defining 
“equitable relief” more easily delineates the available remedies and 
avoids the overly formalistic approach taken thus far by the Supreme 
Court. 
                                                                                                                                      
administered in a single action at law; and, so far at least as form is concerned, 
all distinction between equity and law be ended, yet the jurisdiction of the 
Federal court, sitting as a court of equity, remains unchanged.”). 
 11. The dissenting Justices agreed.  See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 233 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court’s equation of ‘equity’ with the rigid 
application of rules frozen in a bygone era, I maintain, is thus, 
‘unjustifiabl[e]’ . . . .”); id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This does not 
mean, however, that all inquiries . . . must involve historical analysis . . . .”).  
For another view arguing that the Great-West Life decision was incorrectly 
reasoned, see Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 
S.M.U. L. Rev. 1577, 1616–22 (2002) (arguing the Court incorrectly classified 
the relief requested as restitution, misread historical practice, and suggested 
that a claim for specific money in defendant’s possession was always equitable 
restitution.) 
 12. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 3–7; LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
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I.  CONCEPTIONS OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION BEFORE  
GREAT-WEST LIFE 
A.  A Brief History of Restitution 
Restitution is commonly understood as a remedy that requires 
the disgorgement or return of the defendant’s unjust benefit.13  At its 
simplest level, it is a remedy that focuses on the defendant’s gain in 
contrast to most other remedies that focus on the plaintiff’s loss.14  
Yet restitution is more complex because it is both a theory of liability 
based on the unjust enrichment of the defendant, and a remedy for 
other liability theories requiring the stripping of defendant’s gain.15  
This dual meaning of “restitution” is simply a feature of its 
development under the common law writ system in which the claim 
or writ designated the specific remedy.  For example, if there is no 
contract upon which to base a claim for compensatory damages, 
restitution might provide a viable alternative basis of unjust 
enrichment upon which to seek the return of the defendant’s gain.  
However, a request for a restitution remedy might also be based on a 
proven breach of contract claim.16  Thus, restitution as a remedy can 
be used with a restitution liability theory or with a regular type of 
contract, tort, or property claim.17 
Courts of common law and chancery both developed restitution 
theories in order to authorize relief that they otherwise were 
jurisdictionally prohibited from imposing.  For example, courts of 
law developed theories like replevin to allow them to order the return 
of specific property rather than being limited to awarding a money 
judgment for lost property, and quasi contract to award damages 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 4–5, 365–68; LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 523–25.  “Disgorge” means to 
surrender unwillingly.  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 533 (4th ed. 2000). 
 14. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 368; LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 524. 
 15. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 366; LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 523–25. 
 16. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 523, 
553–54; see, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 440 U.S. 507 (1980) (awarding 
restitution in the amount of defendant’s profit for employee’s breach of 
employment agreement pledging not to divulge classified CIA information). 
 17. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 523; 
ELAINE W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES 770–71 (2d ed. 
1995). 
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even in the absence of a breach of contract causing a compensable 
loss.18  Similarly, courts of equity developed claims for constructive 
trust and equitable lien to permit them to award money through these 
fictionalized paths to recovery.19  Thus, equity courts historically did 
award money despite the apparent jurisdictional prohibition. 
For the most part, few distinctions between the historic legal and 
equitable restitution remain.  The first Restatement of Restitution 
recharacterized historical practice into two groups:  legal restitution 
was classified in part I of the Restatement as “quasi contract”20 and 
equitable restitution was classified in part II of the Restatement as 
“constructive trust.”21  But the drafters advocated a generalized 
approach to restitution, viewing it as a holistic remedy applicable to 
all cases and characterized by its disgorgement of the defendant’s 
gain.22  American law students are commonly instructed in the 
leading Remedies textbooks that the forms of restitution—
constructive trust, equitable lien, and quasi contract—are legal 
fictions rather than real claims.23  There is no real contract in quasi 
contract, no real trust in constructive trust, and no real lien in 
equitable lien.24  Thus, students and lawyers are told that the 
restitution devices are not meaningful, but rather are mere 
frameworks for legal arguments that must be made as long as courts 
are wedded to these antiquated terms.25  The only relevant practical 
distinction between legal and equitable restitution is whether a jury 
trial is available.26  The common working assumption and practice 
among lawyers is simply that restitution is an alternative remedy to 
compensatory damages or injunctive relief available in any type of 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 383–90. 
 19. See id. at 391–413. 
 20. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACT AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS pt. 1 (1937). 
 21. See id. pt. 2. 
 22. See id. at Introduction. 
 23. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 526; 
SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 17, at 770. 
 24. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 529, 
548–49; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (distinguishing between 
constructive trust and express trust). 
 25. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 526. 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Discussion Draft 2000).  For cases addressing the Seventh Amendment right 
to a jury trial for restitutionary remedies, see infra cases cited in note 58. 
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case.  This was apparently the assumption upon which Great-West 
proceeded in its case, seeking the alternative remedies of specific 
performance or reimbursement of the defendant’s gain for breach of 
the insurance contract.27 
B.  Justice Scalia’s Precedent on the Law/Equity Distinction 
Confusion and debate over equitable restitution have been 
percolating through the Supreme Court for the past decade.  Scalia’s 
reinvention of equity in Great-West Life is not new; it had its genesis 
fourteen years ago in his dissent in Bowen v. Massachusetts.28  
Justice Scalia comes full circle in Great-West Life and resurrects his 
dissenting opinion in Bowen with respect to the law/equity 
distinction and transforms it, with the switch of Justice O’Connor, 
into a binding precedent that effectively restates the law of 
restitution.29 
Dissenting in Bowen, Justice Scalia created a distinction 
between legal and equitable relief that would have denied the 
restitutionary relief sought by the State in the case seeking 
reimbursement of Medicaid funds wrongfully retained by the federal 
government.30  The applicable statute at issue in Bowen authorized 
remedies “other than money damages.”31  To interpret this remedial 
phrase, Justice Scalia divided remedies into two categories:  damages 
and specific relief.32  He stated that the line between these two 
categories “must surely be drawn on the basis of the substance of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. Great-West did not identify the specific form of this restitutionary claim 
until its briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court when it argued that its 
reimbursement claim constituted one of a multitude of restitution claims 
including constructive trust, equitable lien, and subrogation.  See infra text 
accompanying note 85. 
 28. 487 U.S. 879, 913–30 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Indeed, much of Justice Scalia’s language in the Great-West Life 
opinion is taken verbatim from his dissenting opinion in Bowen.  Compare 
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210–15 (2002), 
with Bowen, 487 U.S. at 915–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (containing same 
phrases). 
 30. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 914–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 31. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (authorizing “action 
in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages”). 
 32. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 913–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia defines 
specific relief as that relief which undoes or prevents harm.  See id. at 914 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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claim, and not its mere form.”33  Where the substance of the claim 
was seeking payment of a sum of money, as was the claim in Bowen, 
Justice Scalia found it to be a request for damages.34  The majority of 
six justices, however, disagreed, holding that a claim seeking 
reimbursement of unjustly retained benefits was a restitutionary 
remedy not precluded by the statute.35  In addition, Justice Scalia 
further opined that in his view, “‘restitution’ in the judicial context 
commonly consists of money damages.”36 
Yet in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,37 Justice Scalia reversed 
this position, holding that restitution is a type of remedy typically 
found in equity.38  In Mertens, Scalia commanded a bare majority of 
the Court to hold that “equitable relief” authorized by ERISA means 
only “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity 
(such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory 
damages).”39  He elaborates upon restitution and states that 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains is the type of remedy falling within 
statutory authorizations of equitable relief.40  In addition, he 
expressly rejects a statutory definition that would look closely to the 
pre-merger practice of courts of equity, arguing that such a statutory 
meaning is unlikely as “memories of the divided bench, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. Id. at 915 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He went on to explain, “one of the 
few clearly established principles is that the substance of the pleadings must 
prevail over their form.”  Id. at 916 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34. See id. at 918 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 35. See id. at 893–94.  Justice Scalia lamely attempts to distinguish the 
holding of Bowen in Great-West Life by characterizing it primarily as a request 
for injunctive relief to prevent withholding of benefits accompanied by a 
request for the return of specific monies.  See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 212.  
Bowen, however, involved a similar type of reimbursement to that sought in 
Great-West Life, although the basis of the reimbursement was statutory rather 
than contractual.  See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893–94. 
 36. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 917 n.2. 
 37. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 38. See id. at 256. 
 39. Id.  Professor Laycock pointed out that this statement was inaccurate 
since mandamus was exclusively legal and restitution was available in both 
law and equity.  See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, 
at 7–8. 
 40. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260 (“even in its more limited sense, the 
‘equitable relief’ awardable under [ERISA] includes restitution of ill-gotten 
plan assets or profits.”). 
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familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the 
past.”41 
However, in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond 
Fund,42 Justice Scalia applied the test he had previously rejected in 
Mertens.43  He looked to historical equity practice in order to deny 
the requested preliminary injunction freezing assets in a case seeking 
compensatory damages.44  He reasoned that the form of requested 
relief—a preliminary injunction in a case of legal damages—was 
“unknown to traditional equity practice” in the English Courts of 
Chancery and thus was unavailable in federal court.45  The federal 
courts, Scalia held, have authority to award only those judicial 
remedies devised and administered by the English chancery courts as 
of the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.46  He justified 
his modern reliance upon pre-merger practice by stating that “the 
merger [of law and equity] did not alter substantive rights.”47  Justice 
Scalia concluded that since the preliminary injunctive remedy is part 
of the substantive property right rather than a mere question of 
procedure, its historic form and usage must be preserved.48 
The three contradictory strains of reasoning on the law/equity 
distinction developed in Justice Scalia’s prior cases converge in his 
decision in Great-West Life, once again for the purpose of denying 
the requested relief. 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Id. at 256. 
 42. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
 43. See id. at 333. 
 44. See id. (holding that “[b]ecause such a remedy was historically 
unavailable from a court of equity,” the district court had no authority to issue 
the preliminary injunction); see also Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon 
Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 252 (2000) (relying upon the common 
law of trusts and common-law remedial principles to hold that restitution claim 
under ERISA was equitable relief); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427–
28 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority 
that determining the legal or equitable nature of a claim should be based upon 
historical practice). 
 45. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 328–33. 
 46. See id. at 318–24. 
 47. Id. at 322. 
 48. See id. at 322–23; see also id. at 318 n.3 (declining to consider for the 
first time on appeal the claim that the availability of the injunction should be 
determined as a substantive rule under state and not federal law). 
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II.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S REINVENTION OF RESTITUTION 
A.  The Great-West Life Definition of Equitable Relief 
Justice Scalia begins his reinvention of restitution in Great-West 
Life with his signature statutory interpretation tenets,49 holding at the 
outset that the statutory term “equitable relief” indicates Congress’s 
intent to limit the availability of remedies under the statute since it 
provided only for equitable rather than all relief.50  Using his 
remedial dichotomy from Bowen of categorizing all remedies as 
either damages or specific relief, Scalia quickly equates equitable 
with specific relief and then concludes that the restitutionary 
monetary relief sought by Great-West constitutes damages.51  
However, Scalia does not end his analysis there, perhaps recognizing 
as he did in Bowen that it can be argued that restitution constitutes a 
request for the return of specific funds.52 
Justice Scalia then adds an additional layer of analysis by 
resorting to the Mertens standard of defining equitable relief as that 
which is “typically available” in equity.  Scalia argues that a Bowen-
type substance test standing alone without reference to the conditions 
that equity typically attached to the provision of remedies, logically 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. See 534 U.S. 204, 209, 212–13 (2002); see, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
581, 581 (1990) (discussing his “intense dislike” for the “oft-repeated 
statement[]” that “remedial statutes are to be liberally construed”); Justice 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989) (discussing general rule of law versus personal discretion to do justice); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) 
(describing Justice Scalia’s statutory interpretation as new, despite the Justice’s 
claim to be returning to a traditional, nineteenth century approach to 
interpretation, because his theory incorporates the intellectual inspirations of 
public choice theory, strict separation of powers, and ideological 
conservatism). 
 50. Cf. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 696 (2001) (“[W]here Congress has created the 
statutory right it may also create the statutory remedy.”). 
 51. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210, 216. 
 52. See id. at 216.  He acknowledged in Bowen that a claim for restitution 
could precisely fit a description of a suit for money damages, because it seeks 
money, but could also fit a general description of a suit for specific relief 
“since the award of money undoes a loss by giving respondent the very thing 
(money) to which he was legally entitled.”  Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 
879, 918 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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leads to the untenable conclusion of authorizing equitable relief that 
was never permitted at common law, thereby rendering the statutory 
limitation of relief meaningless.53  Accordingly, Scalia in Great-West 
Life amends his Mertens standard to determine the typical 
availability of remedies not by general category, but rather by 
formal, claim-specific qualifications that he alleges existed in pre-
merger days.54 
This reliance upon ancient equitable devices and historical 
practice integrates Scalia’s reasoning from Grupo Mexicano and 
similarly portrays the fictional remedial devices as substantive rights.  
Just as in Grupo Mexicano, Justice Scalia looks to historical practice 
of England in the eighteenth century to determine the nature and 
requirements of modern equitable relief.55  By using the cases of 
Bowen, Mertens, and Grupo Mexicano in combination, Justice Scalia 
is able to accomplish a 180-degree shift in the Court’s jurisprudence 
by converting his lone dissent in Bowen into a binding decision. 
In Great-West Life, Justice Scalia then translates these general 
principles of jurisprudence into a more precise standard for 
discerning the historical parameters of equitable restitution.56  He 
defines equitable restitution by 1) the request for specific relief rather 
than money,57 2) the historical nature of the attendant cause of action 
as equitable,58 and 3) the formalistic conditions restricting the award 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 216. 
 54. See id. at 216–17.  This elaboration of the word “typical” seems to 
conflate the questions of remedy characterization and qualification, even 
though the statute expressly provides separate words for each concept—i.e., 
whether other “equitable” relief is “appropriate.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3)(B) (2000). 
 55. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 212–14. 
 56. See id. at 210–20.  The Court uses the same three factors to reject 
Great-West’s alternate claim for equitable relief seeking specific performance 
of the reimbursement clause.  Justice Scalia finds first that the substance of the 
request is simply money and thus constitutes damages.  Second, that the 
irreparable injury standard disqualified such requests for performance of a 
contract when legal damages were adequate.  And third, that this form of 
specific performance was not available in pre-merger courts of equity.  See id. 
 57. See id. at 214 (“[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally 
must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to 
the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”). 
 58. See id. at 216.  The Court has used the historical nature of the claim to 
guide it in its determination of whether a case is one at common law which 
requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.  In these Seventh 
Amendment cases, the Court examines both the nature of the action and the 
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of such relief.59  Justice Scalia readily admits that Supreme Court 
cases “have not previously drawn this fine distinction between 
restitution at law and restitution in equity.”60  However, he uses these 
distinguishing factors to conclude that equitable restitution only 
includes claims for constructive trust, equitable lien, or accounting 
for profits, which expressly seek the return of specific funds or 
property belonging to the plaintiff now in the defendant’s 
possession.61  Thus, a five-justice majority of the Court concludes 
that Great-West’s request for the imposition of personal liability 
upon Knudson for a contractual obligation to pay money is legal 
relief precluded by the federal statute.62 
                                                                                                                                      
remedy sought.  See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 
U.S. 340, 348 (1998); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. 
Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (stating the second inquiry regarding the nature of 
the remedy is more important in the analysis); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 417–18 (1987).  Interestingly, the Court seemed to say in the case of 
Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), that the Constitution required 
federal courts to grant a jury trial whenever the claim was one for money even 
though the claim was for accounting for profits.  See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 
413.  For an in depth discussion of these and other related cases, see Murphy, 
supra note 11, at 1623–28. 
 59. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214, 216.  Similarly, the Court in its 
opinion in Great-West Life, addressing the plaintiff’s claim for specific 
performance, denies such relief holding that the condition of the irreparable 
injury rule at common law precluded such equitable relief where legal relief 
was adequate.  See id. at 212–13.  However, commentators have explained that 
this irreparable injury rule is in fact dead in our modern times, posing no 
impediment to the award of equitable relief.  See LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 356–59; Laycock, The Scope and 
Significance of Restitution, supra note 9, at 1278. 
 60. Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214–15. 
 61. “[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek . . . to 
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant’s 
possession.”  Id. at 214.  In Bowen, Scalia defined specific relief as that which 
“prevents or undoes the loss.”  Bowen, 487 U.S. at 914 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
His definition in Great-West Life of specific relief, perhaps intentionally, omits 
this broader concept of undoing the harm or restoration of the status quo ante, 
which arguably is what Great-West sought.  See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 
214. 
 62. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 220–21.  “A claim for money due and 
owing under a contract is ‘quintessentially an action at law.’”  Id. at 210 
(quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000)).  
“Such claims were viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract 
(whether the contract was actual or implied).”  Id. at 213. 
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B.  Justice Scalia’s Misguided Approach to Equitable Relief 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, allegedly based upon historical 
practice, is mistaken in several respects, casting doubt upon the 
validity of the Court’s holding.  The majority opinion in Great-West 
Life alters the historical record of equitable restitution in several 
respects and blatantly contradicts controlling Supreme Court 
precedent in its rush to narrow the availability of equitable relief in 
federal court. 
First, Justice Scalia has improperly categorized the historical 
forms of equitable restitution.  He includes accounting for profits, 
which is seemingly disqualified under the Great-West Life tripartite 
test due to its legal nature and monetary form.63  Indeed, Scalia 
acknowledges in Great-West Life that the accounting for profits 
device fails to satisfy his rule mandating specific relief, but he 
nevertheless includes it as a “limited exception.”64  The retention of 
the accounting for profits remedy within Justice Scalia’s definition is 
significant, as it has been recently argued that the accounting remedy 
is an easy way to obtain monetary relief for breach of contract 
measured by the defendant’s gain.65 
Second, Justice Scalia’s inclusion of the equitable lien 
contradicts the Court’s unanimous decision just three years before in 
the little-noticed case of Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.66  
In Blue Fox, the Court held that a claim for an equitable lien to 
obtain monies owed to a government subcontractor was simply one 
for legal damages not authorized by the federal statute.67  In this 
respect, Blue Fox is consistent with Scalia’s first factor of discerning 
equitable relief that hones in on the monetary form of the remedy 
sought.  However, the Blue Fox Court refused to place any 
                                                                                                                                      
 63. See 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1420 
(1881) (noting that the action of accounting was “one of the most ancient 
actions known to the common law,” but that limited suits for an 
accounting were available in equity when the legal remedy was 
inadequate). 
 64. Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214 n.2; cf. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (awarding a remedy of accounting for 
profits without constructive trust). 
 65. See Sam Doyle & David Wright, Restitutionary Damages—The 
Unnecessary Remedy?, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001). 
 66. 525 U.S. 255 (1999). 
 67. See id. at 264–65. 
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significance on the formal device pled, emphasizing that what is 
important is the “real remedy, the final object of the proceeding, the 
pecuniary recovery”68 rather than the form of the remedy, which is 
“merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of 
money.”69  The Blue Fox Court concluded that the equitable lien was 
not specific relief:  “equitable liens by their nature constitute 
substitute or compensatory relief rather than specific relief” because 
they do not give the plaintiff the very thing to which he is entitled, 
but merely grant a security interest in the property to satisfy a money 
claim.70 
In contrast, Justice Scalia in Great-West Life relies heavily upon 
the particular claim pled to define equity.  Thus Scalia concludes, 
contrary to Blue Fox, that an equitable lien is an equitable remedy.  
Scalia may have the better argument, as an equitable lien is a classic 
equitable restitution remedy exclusively available in courts of 
equity.71  A decree establishing and enforcing an equitable lien upon 
property is a purely equitable remedy that results in personal liability 
against the defendant to pay a monetary sum.72  However, the Great-
West Life opinion makes no attempt to distinguish Blue Fox or 
explain if its three-part analysis of equitable relief trumps the 
pecuniary object test of Blue Fox. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia is wrong that monetary awards are 
never equitable.  Justice Scalia adamantly reiterates several times 
throughout his opinion that a suit for money simply is not an action 
for equitable relief.73  His assumption that courts of equity could not 
                                                                                                                                      
 68. Id. at 263 (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 112 (5th ed. 1941)). 
 69. Id. at 262. 
 70. Id.  Here the Court quotes Professor Laycock’s characterization of the 
equitable lien as “a hybrid, granting a money judgment and securing its 
collection with a lien on the specific thing.”  Id. at 263 (quoting Douglas 
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 
1290 (1989)). 
 71. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 391 (listing the classic equitable restitution 
remedies developed by the courts of equity as the constructive trust, the 
equitable lien, subrogation, and accounting for profits); see also 3 POMEROY, 
supra note 63, §§ 1296, 1413. 
 72. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, pt. II, Introductory Note & § 161 cmt. 
a, b; 3 POMEROY, supra note 63, § 1413. 
 73. “‘Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, 
or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff 
are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally been applied.”  
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award pecuniary remedies imposing personal liability upon 
defendants does not comport with historical accounts of equitable 
practice.  Pomeroy provides one of the best explanations of the 
remedies available in courts of equity: 
§ 1296.  Effects of Contracts in General. . . . Where a 
contract stipulates merely for personal acts to be done or 
omitted, the equitable and the legal notions as to its effects 
are the same; the resulting rights are strictly personal in 
equity as well as at law.  Where an executory contract deals 
with or relates to property, real or personal, as its subject 
matter, its operation in equity may be the same as at law; 
under proper circumstances courts of equity may treat the 
resulting rights and obligations as purely personal. [N1] 
 
N1.  That is, an executory contract relating to money or to 
other property, may, in equity, as at law, be treated as 
imposing only the personal obligation of ordinary 
indebtedness, as creating only the personal right to a 
pecuniary payment, and as enforced only by the recovery of 
a general pecuniary judgment.  This purely legal aspect of 
contracts is, however, very uncommon.  In almost all cases 
where there is a personal indebtedness, and a pecuniary 
recovery, as in suits for an accounting, and the like, the 
ultimate remedy is made more efficient by the notion of 
some equitable interest, lien, or charge, or some trust, 
attaching to specific funds of money, or of securities, by 
which the actual relief consists in reaching and 
appropriating such specific fund or other form of 
property.74 
                                                                                                                                      
Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 
879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  Equitable restitution does not 
include actions that seek to impose “‘personal liability upon the defendant to 
pay a sum of money’.”  Id. at 213 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§ 160 cmt. a).  “Because petitioners are seeking legal relief—the imposition of 
personal liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money—
§ 502(a)(3) does not authorize this action.”  Id. at 221. 
 74. 3 POMEROY, supra note 63, § 1296. 
THOMAS_POST_RR_FINAL 3/27/03  4:53 PM 
Winter 2003] SCALIA REINVENTS RESTITUTION 1077 
Courts of equity possessed both concurrent and exclusive 
jurisdiction.75  Concurrent jurisdiction included those remedies 
available in both courts of equity and courts of common law.  Equity 
courts had the ability to award remedies for pecuniary recovery for 
violations of rights recognized in courts of common law.76  As 
Pomeroy explained: 
The remedies composing this group belong to the 
concurrent jurisdiction of equity; since the final reliefs are 
the same in form and substance, as that granted, under like 
circumstances, by a judgment at law—a general pecuniary 
recovery; and since the primary rights and interests of the 
parties are generally recognized and protected by the law.77 
Examples of remedies available under equity’s concurrent 
jurisdiction include accounting for profits, subrogation, and 
contribution.  Exclusive jurisdiction encompassed those remedies 
that were available only in courts of equity:  “They are all purely 
equitable, and therefore belong to the exclusive jurisdiction; because 
although the final relief is pecuniary, and so resembles the ordinary 
relief at law, it is obtained through preliminary proceedings, forming 
a part of the judgment, which belong solely to the procedure and 
jurisdiction of equity.”78 
The key distinction and advantage of equitable monetary 
remedies was that equity converted an otherwise general pecuniary 
judgment into a personal command to the defendant to pay.79  This 
personal command was backed by the court’s contempt power and 
                                                                                                                                      
 75. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY 61–62 (1936).  Courts of equity also possessed auxiliary jurisdiction 
allowing them to issue remedies in aid of their jurisdiction, such as discovery 
requests and depositions. 
 76. As McClintock described in his treatise on equity, concurrent 
jurisdiction includes all cases where the court of equity grants relief for the 
protection of common law rights because the common law remedies for the 
protection of those rights are not adequate.  The primary or original substantive 
right of the plaintiff is a legal right, but the secondary or remedial right given 
by the court of common law does not afford adequate remedy.  See id. at 61. 
 77. 3 POMEROY, supra note 63, § 1416. 
 78. Id. § 1413. 
 79. See DE FUNIAK, supra note 3, at 12; DOBBS, supra note 9, at 54; 
Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity (1945), in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON EQUITY 53, 55 (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (stating that a judgment 
of a common-law court creates rights in the plaintiff whereas a decree in equity 
operating in personam imposes duties upon the defendant). 
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thus made enforcement of the remedy more effective and efficient.80  
The Supreme Court in Great-West Life has redefined the legal 
meaning of “equitable relief” more narrowly than the actual remedial 
practice of the equity courts.  The Supreme Court has now limited 
authorizations of equitable relief to only those remedies exclusively 
available in courts of equity to remedy equitable rather than legal 
wrongs.81 
Justice Scalia then holds that Great-West failed to satisfy the 
formal requirements of a claim for equitable restitution.82  Great-
West initially pled its case as one for injunctive and declaratory 
relief.83  Indeed, it was not until briefing to the Supreme Court, 
triggered by a reference in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion denying it 
relief,84 that Great-West (and the Solicitor General’s office) argued 
that the claim for reimbursement under the contract constituted one 
of several restitution devices including constructive trust or equitable 
lien.85  Rather than adopting the modern view of a constructive trust 
                                                                                                                                      
 80. The ancient maxim was the “equity acts in personam.”  DE FUNIAK, 
supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 81. But see MCCLINTOCK, supra note 75, at 61 (describing equity’s 
distinguishing characteristics of the kinds of relief given and the methods by 
which such relief is administered that can be exercised in almost any of the 
various fields of law). 
 82. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214. 
 83. See id. at 208–09; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Great-West Life (No. 99-1786), available at 2001 WL 
506039, at *11 (July 29, 2001) [hereinafter Brief for Solicitor General]. 
 84. The Ninth Circuit conclusively held that Great-West’s claim for 
reimbursement payments made pursuant to an insurance plan was not equitable 
relief based upon its prior decision in FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 
1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1997).  See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 208 F.3d 221 (9th Cir. 2000).  In Owens, the Ninth Circuit held that 
relief is not equitable when the substance of the claim is money.  See 122 F.3d 
at 1261.  It further held that reimbursement for insurance payments from 
settlement proceeds received from a third-party tortfeasor could not be justified 
as either subrogation, general restitution, or constructive trust.  See id. at 1259–
61.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Great-West Life was defended neither by 
the victorious plaintiff in the case nor the Solicitor General, but rather by an 
attorney appointed specially by the Supreme Court whose brief influenced 
much of Justice Scalia’s opinion.  See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Judgment Below By Invitation of the Court, Great-West Life 
(No. 99-1786), available at 2001 WL 740878 (briefing by attorney Richard 
Taranto). 
 85. See Brief for Petitioners, Great-West Life (No. 99-1786), available at 
2001 WL 506021, at *33, *41, *44 (noting that other federal courts of appeal 
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as an implied fiction imposed to facilitate recovery of money,86 
Justice Scalia views the constructive trust as a substantive claim 
which must fit the real facts.87  Thus, the Court insists upon rigid 
conformance to the requisite elements required for a claim of 
constructive trust.  Justice Scalia then easily concludes that Great-
West cannot make out a claim for constructive trust.  He finds that 
Great-West is not making a claim for the return of particular funds it 
previously owned, nor seeking the return of its funds from the 
defendant, since the settlement monies were distributed to a special 
needs trust, the attorney, and Medi-Cal.88 
Yet the Supreme Court recently held in Harris Trust & Savings 
Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.,89 that a constructive trust 
remedy is appropriate equitable relief where funds are in the 
possession of a third party.90  Indeed, Judge Posner, whom Justice 
                                                                                                                                      
have appropriately characterized the plan reimbursement provision as one for 
restitution, constructive trust, and equitable lien); Brief for Solicitor General, 
supra note 83, at *17–19 (Great-West’s reimbursement claim may be properly 
characterized as one for restitution, constructive trust, or equitable lien and 
perhaps subrogation). 
 86. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (describing constructive trust 
as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment and cautioning against 
conceptualizing it as a real trust involving fiduciary duties and holding of title); 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 526. 
 87. Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 
308, 322 (1999) (holding that courts must look to availability of equitable 
remedies in pre-merger times because merger did not change substantive 
rights); Thomas, supra note 50, at 687–95 (arguing that remedies are 
substantive rather than procedural rights because they give life to otherwise 
inert guarantees). 
 88. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 212–15.  However, Justice Ginsburg in 
dissent easily found that Great-West established a cause of action for specific 
relief:   
That Great-West requests restitution is beyond dispute.  The relief 
would operate to transfer from the Knudsons funds over which Great-
West claims to be the rightful owner . . . Great-West alleges that the 
Knudsons would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the 
funds . . . And Great-West sued to recover an amount representing the 
Knudsons’ unjust gain, rather than Great-West’s loss. 
Id. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 89. 530 U.S. 238 (2000). 
 90. See id. at 250 (using constructive trust theory, a plaintiff may “maintain 
an action for restitution of the property (if not already disposed of) or 
disgorgement of proceeds (if already disposed of), and disgorgement of the 
third person’s profits derived therefrom”); id. at 251 (court of equity has 
jurisdiction in a constructive trust action to “reach the property either in the 
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Scalia quotes at length in his opinion as supporting his reinvention 
theories, reached the opposite conclusion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
Associates Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells,91 and held that a 
constructive trust was an appropriate remedy when imposed to 
reimburse funds to an insurance company from a settlement that 
were in the possession of a third party, the defendant’s attorney, as 
they were in Great-West Life.92  These interpretative differences 
seem to demonstrate Justice Ginsburg’s point in her dissent in Great-
West Life that the qualification rules for these antiquated restitution 
devices, such as the constructive trust, are in conflict, thus 
contributing to the unworkability of Justice Scalia’s test.93 
One missing link in the Great-West Life decision is a discussion 
of subrogation.  Most business and legal practitioners would classify 
this case as one for subrogation.94  Under subrogation, an innocent 
third party, here the insurance company, steps into the shoes of the 
plaintiff, Knudson, for purposes of recovering monies paid to the 
plaintiff by a third-party wrongdoer, Hyundai.95  There is some 
disagreement as to whether the reimbursement type of subrogation, 
in which the insurer sues the insured, is the same as traditional 
subrogation under which the insurer sues the third party.96  And 
                                                                                                                                      
hands of the original wrongdoer, or in the hands of any subsequent holder, 
until a purchaser of it in good faith and without notice acquires a higher right 
and takes the property relieved from the trust.”) (quoting 2 JOHN NORTON 
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1053 (1886)). 
 91. 213 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 92. See id. at 401; see also Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc. v. Washington, 
187 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (insurance company seeking reimbursement 
from settlement proceeds is not seeking “damages, or indeed any form of 
payment,” but rather is seeking the imposition of a constructive trust on the 
plan beneficiary’s claim to the money). 
 93. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 231–32 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 94. See Supreme Court Decision Highlights Third-Party Dangers for 
Health Plans, BEST’S INS. NEWS, Mar. 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
4524508 (quoting Bryan Davenport’s statement that “[a]lthough the court did 
not mention subrogation in its decision, this case has everything to do with 
subrogation . . . .”). 
 95. See DE FUNIAK, supra note 3, at 239; DOBBS, supra note 9, at 404. 
 96. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (treating 
insurance company’s suit for reimbursement of medical expenses from third-
party tortfeasor suit as subrogation); Lisa N. Bleed, Comment, Enforcing 
Subrogation Provisions As “Appropriate Equitable Relief” Under ERISA 
Section 502(a)(3), 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2001) (distinguishing 
“traditional” subrogation from “reimbursement-type” subrogation).  But see 
THOMAS_POST_RR_FINAL 3/27/03  4:53 PM 
Winter 2003] SCALIA REINVENTS RESTITUTION 1081 
perhaps this explains the Court’s inclination that the suit here was 
merely one for breach of contract rather than subrogation as against a 
third party.97  But the more problematic aspect of viewing this case 
as one for subrogation is that historically, subrogation was available 
in both law and equity.98  So although the Supreme Court has 
recognized subrogation as an equitable remedy,99 perhaps its dual 
availability in courts of law and equity exclude it from Justice 
Scalia’s redefinition of restitution.100  The ultimate effect of Justice 
Scalia’s decision in Great-West Life is to limit modern courts to 
awarding only those remedies that were exclusively awarded by 
courts of chancery.  In so doing, he has converted a unique 
enforcement mechanism available in equity into a required element 
of recovery. 
The combined rule of Great-West Life and Blue Fox is that the 
Supreme Court now distinguishes legal from equitable remedies 
based on the monetary nature of such relief rather than the working 
categorization of legal and equitable relief.  In the Court’s view as 
seen in Blue Fox and Great-West Life, money constitutes a legal 
remedy substituting for the actual loss regardless of whether the 
claim for money is framed as one for equitable lien, specific 
                                                                                                                                      
Brief for Solicitor General, supra note 83, at *19 (arguing that subrogation and 
reimbursement differ only procedurally in that for subrogation the insurer 
proceeds against the third-party tortfeasor whereas under reimbursement it 
proceeds against the insured, but both have similar justifications to prevent 
unjust enrichment and both have similar substantive effects of preventing 
double recovery). 
 97. But see Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 220 (suggesting without opinion 
that there may have been other means for Great-West to obtain the equitable 
relief they sought by suing the attorney and Special Needs Trust which held the 
settlement funds won by Knudson). 
 98. See, e.g., American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 692 
F.2d 455, 460 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing legal subrogation as grounded 
in equity and conventional subrogation as grounded in contract); DE FUNIAK, 
supra note 3, at 239 (distinguishing contractual subrogation based on an 
agreement from subrogation arising from equitable origin). 
 99. See United States v. California, 507 U.S. 746, 757–58 (1993) (holding 
that subrogation is equitable action); see also DOBBS, supra note 9, at 391 
(identifying subrogation as one of the four classic equitable restitution 
remedies). 
 100. See Hotel & Rest. & Bar Employees v. Truong, 27 Empl. Ben. Cas. 
1657, 2002 WL 171725 (D. Minn. 2002) (deciding after Great-West Life that 
medical insurer’s subrogation claim seeking reimbursement from insured was 
merely monetary relief that was not “equitable relief” authorized by ERISA). 
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performance, or restitution.  The practical effect of Justice Scalia’s 
equity jurisprudence culminating in Great-West Life is that statutory 
authorizations of equitable relief or relief “other than money 
damages” become restrictions rather than authorizations of broad 
remedies or “catchall remedial provisions” as described by the 
Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe.101  Historically, “equitable” 
was not a significant obstacle to relief in the courts.  But Justice 
Scalia has reversed that pattern to convert the flexible remedy of 
equity into a narrow, rarely-occurring award.102  That is a pattern 
seen in Justice Scalia’s other opinions on equity and which casts 
some jurisprudential light upon his possible motivations in 
reinventing restitution:  for all seek to restrict the availability of 
equitable relief in federal court.103 
III.  REMEDIAL PURPOSE AS THE INTERPRETIVE KEY 
The downfall of Justice Scalia’s approach in Great-West Life 
was his reliance upon inaccessible historical practice to interpret 
modern statutory language.  As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
argued in dissent, “it is fanciful to assume that in 1974 Congress 
intended to revive the obsolete distinctions between law and equity 
as a basis for defining the remedies available in federal court.”104  
Indeed Justice Scalia himself in Mertens rejected such reliance upon 
historical practice to define “equitable relief” finding that such a 
legislative definition was unlikely “[a]s memories of the divided 
bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further 
into the past.”105 
                                                                                                                                      
 101. 516 U.S. 489, 510–11 (1996). 
 102. See Kishter v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 103. See discussion supra at Part I.B (discussing Justice Scalia’s other 
decisions on equity); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies 
Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
(forthcoming Fall 2002) (manuscript at 62–63, on file with author) (discussing 
Justice Scalia’s opinions criticizing structural and prophylactic injunctive 
relief). 
 104. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221–22 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 105. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
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It seems that a better approach would be to distinguish equitable 
remedies from those at law based upon their intended purpose.106  If 
a remedy seeks to obtain money for plaintiff’s loss, it is damages.  If 
a remedy seeks to obtain money for a defendant’s benefit, it is 
restitution.  If a remedy seeks to obtain money by performance of the 
contract, it is an injunction.  Not all money constitutes damages.107  
Money can be used to satisfy a variety of purposes:  compensate for 
loss (compensatory damages), punish reprehensible behavior 
(punitive damages), coerce specific acts (civil contempt), or disgorge 
unjust benefit (restitution).  Focusing on the purpose or goal of the 
remedy rather than on the superficial form of the relief would better 
preserve remedial rights of plaintiffs and keep the power of courts 
intact to remedy wrongs.108 
Glimmers of a purpose-determinative test appear in the Court’s 
prior cases.  While the Court’s reasoning in Blue Fox focuses on the 
specific device and the monetary nature of the relief, its conclusion 
refers to the ultimate purpose of the remedy sought.109  It concludes 
that the subcontractor’s request for money constituted damages 
because the remedy’s goal was compensation for the plaintiff’s loss 
under the contract.110  Thus, it was the compensatory purpose, not the 
monetary form that was determinative of the nature of the remedy. 
Furthermore, the purpose-determinative test serves the gate-
keeping function of blocking inappropriate claims that is seemingly 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 
558, 571 n.8 (1990) (the analysis of the nature of a remedy should not replicate 
the “abstruse historical inquiry” into a comparison of remedies in the courts of 
England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity, but rather 
“requires consideration of the general types of relief provided by courts of law 
and equity.”). 
 107. Justice Scalia states in Bowen v. Massachusetts that “‘money damages’ 
is something of a redundancy.”  487 U.S. 879, 914 (1988).  That is true with 
respect to damages, for all damages are money, but not with respect to money 
for not all money is damages, as the Bowen majority held.  See id. at 893 (“The 
fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is 
not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’”); see 
also Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 570 (“This Court has not, however, held that any 
award of monetary relief must necessarily be ‘legal’ relief.”). 
 108. Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477–78 (stating that the 
constitutional right to jury trial in suits at common law “cannot be made to 
depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.”). 
 109. See Dept. of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 263 (1999). 
 110. See id. 
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important to the Court.  For example, the AARP in its amicus brief in 
Great-West Life argued that “[q]uite simply, make-whole relief 
should be the meaning of ‘appropriate equitable relief.’”111  But a 
remedy that makes the plaintiff whole is focused on the goal of 
compensating for the plaintiff’s loss, not ensuring that the 
defendant’s gain is disgorged or that the defendant is returned to his 
rightful position.112  The purpose-determinative test would prevent 
the restitution remedy from expanding to include every remedial 
purpose. 
As applied in Great-West Life, the purpose-determinative test 
would ask what goal Great-West is seeking to further by its request 
for $411,000.  A restitution purpose would require Great-West to 
seek to disgorge the unjust benefit obtained by Knudson.  Arguably, 
as Justice Ginsburg stated in dissent, the unjust benefit was 
Knudson’s retention of double payments for her medical injuries 
from both the insurance company and the settlement, resulting in a 
windfall to her that goes beyond compensation for her loss.113  
Justice Scalia himself, when sitting as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, 
found that such retention of double payments from an insurer and 
settlement constitutes the kind of unjust enrichment that restitution is 
designed to prevent.114  The problem for Great-West was that it was 
not in fact seeking disgorgement of the double payments.  Knudson’s 
settlement funds were primarily for future medical expenses that had 
not yet been paid and for attorney fees necessary to litigate the 
difficult case.  The only double recovery, as the state court found, 
was the $13,828 of the settlement allocated to past medical bills. 
Instead, the $411,000 sought was the amount of loss that Great-
West arguably suffered under the contract breached by Knudson.115  
                                                                                                                                      
 111. Brief of AARP in Support of Neither Party, Great-West Life (No. 99-
1786), available at 2001 WL 476084, at *2; see also Petitioners’ Reply Brief, 
Mertens (No. 91-1671), available at 1993 WL 289713, at *6–7 (arguing that 
equitable relief includes “make-whole” relief to compensate for losses). 
 112. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 948 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(finding no claim for restitution under ERISA where defendant had no benefit 
or gain and where plaintiffs sought money for their own losses). 
 113. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 114. See Carter v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 751 F.2d 1398 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing the double recovery problem and equitable 
principles of subrogation to avoid such double recovery). 
 115. Alternatively, Great-West could have argued that the $411,000 was a 
restitution measure of rescission in which it sought to undo the contract 
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Justice Scalia seems to intimate this in several places throughout the 
opinion by referring to the fact that Great-West is only suing for 
breach of contract and that it seeks merely payment for monies due 
under that contract.116  However, it is not the monetary form of the 
relief that renders it damages, but rather its compensatory purpose.  
Money cannot be a proxy for compensation. 
One court following the Great-West Life decision appeared to 
make this type of purpose inquiry.  In Kishter v. Principal Life 
Insurance,117 an executor of an estate sought payment of $270,000 
due under a life insurance policy that was not paid allegedly because 
of fraud in failing to tell the worker that she was no longer covered 
by the policy.118  After going through the precise analysis the Great-
West Life decision mandates, the court focused on the ultimate 
purpose of the request.119  All the plaintiff sought, said the court, was 
money for the damage and loss he had suffered from the legal 
wrong.120  Thus it was the compensatory purpose of the relief, not its 
monetary form that determined the legal nature of the claim. 
 
*          *          *          *          * 
The Great-West Life decision, read in context of some of the 
Supreme Court’s recent precedents and Justice Scalia’s equity 
decisions, signals a shift toward a narrowing of available equitable 
relief.  The practical result of Justice Scalia’s reinvention of 
restitution is that it severely curtails the available remedies under 
ERISA and seventy-seven other federal statutes that similarly 
authorize equitable relief.121  The irony of Justice Scalia’s definition, 
                                                                                                                                      
because of Knudson’s substantial breach, and be returned to its status quo ante 
with the return of all benefits conferred upon Knudson.  See, e.g., Mobil Oil 
Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000) 
(ordering rescission of contracts for oil drilling due to government’s failure to 
grant exploration permission and restitution of all contract payments). 
 116. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210–12. 
 117. 186 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 118. See id. at 439. 
 119. See id. at 444–46. 
 120. See id. at 446. 
 121. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 217 n.3 (noting that the term 
“equitable relief” appears in seventy-seven provisions in the United States 
Code).  However, Great-West’s counsel in the case disagrees that the case had 
a narrowing effect.  He stated that Great-West is happy with the logic the Court 
used to reach its decision:  “It’s a narrow opinion that leaves most of the 
remedies still available to the plan.”  Allison Bell, High Court: ERISA Limits 
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however, is that restitution was invented historically to allow courts 
of equity to award money—a remedy that they otherwise were 
prohibited from awarding because of the jurisdictional turf battle 
with the courts of common law.122  Thus, the classic equitable 
restitutionary forms, while framed in terms of qualifying rules that 
sound like specific relief, are nothing more than a guise in which to 
award money.  As the Court in Blue Fox noted, the restitution form is 
merely a means to the end of awarding money.123  Thus, Justice 
Scalia’s insistence upon prohibiting monetary awards of restitution, 
unless qualifying under the guise of a constructive trust, will do 
nothing more than foster the kind of “lawyerly inventiveness” Justice 
Scalia condemns in order to obtain relief under many federal 
statutes.124 
                                                                                                                                      
Suits by Plans, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FIN. SERVICES EDITION, 
Jan. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9934900; see, e.g., Great-West Life v. 
Brown, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2002) (granting “restitution in equity” 
in ERISA action where insurer sought to recover for medical benefits from 
funds received by plan beneficiary from recovery in third-party tort suit where 
settlement funds were placed in escrow pending litigation). 
 122. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 48–49, 54; LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES, supra note 9, at 548–49. 
 123. See 525 U.S. 255, 262 (1999). 
 124. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1. 
